Governing Non-profit Organisations: Heroic Myths and Human Tales

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Introduction

During the last decade there has been a rapid growth in the number of voluntary and non-profit organisations in the UK. In part this growth has been stimulated by changes in government policy, such as the contracting out of public services, the local management of schools and the establishment of NHS trusts. These changes have been accompanied by a growing public awareness of the significant role that non-profit organisations are playing in public life.

At the same time, paralleling developments in the private sector, the governance of these organisations has come under increased public scrutiny. Serious questions have been raised about the ability of what are often lay boards to effectively supervise senior managers, oversee financial management and protect the interests of relevant stakeholders and the public. There has been a growing recognition, particularly in the UK and North America, that the challenges facing the governing bodies of voluntary and non-profit organisations are continuing to grow, and that new initiatives are required to improve their effectiveness. This has stimulated various inquiries into the governance of voluntary and non-profit organisations (NCVO, 1992; NFHA, 1995) and a range of practical initiatives and research.

Much of the output from this work on governance is highly prescriptive. It offers advice to governing bodies and board members about how they can improve their performance. Much of this advice is broad ranging and comprehensive. It offers what appears to be an idealised, or heroic account, of what Boards should be able to do and achieve, and fails to adequately recognise the limited time and expertise that board members may be able to bring to their work, or their different motivations and interests. Detailed studies and observations of what boards actually do in practice are much rarer. However, the findings from these studies are very much at odds with the prescriptive accounts, highlighting some of the difficulties and constraints board members face and suggesting a more limited, and human account, of what is possible.

It can be argued that prescriptive models of governance will necessarily be idealistic in order to give people something to aim at. However, as Herman (1989:194) has observed, if the gap between the ideal and reality of governance becomes too large the prescriptive models will be seen as completely unrealistic and lose their power to motivate and guide action.

This paper has two main aims. The first is to critically review and compare some of the recent prescriptive and descriptive literature about governance. This review will map out some of the different assumptions and models about the role of governing bodies, and highlight the gap between the prescriptive and descriptive accounts of governance. The second aim is to outline some directions for future research which might help to close this gap. First though the paper will highlight how contextual changes have influenced this new interest in governance.

The Changing Context

Historically, the way organisations are governed has not attracted a great deal of attention, certainly in the management literature. There appears to have been an implicit assumption that what really matters in organisations is the way they are managed. Since the late 1980's this picture has been changing. In both the USA and the UK there has been a new interest in questions of organisational governance.
Much of this interest has focused on corporate governance. It has been sparked in particular by public concern over the actions of some senior executives and the seeming inability of boards to hold them accountable and kerb excessive behaviour. In the UK, a series of failures and corporate scandals such as Polly Peck, Guinness, BCCI and the Maxwell affair, and the perceived excessive pay rises of company directors, particularly those among the newly privatised utilities, have fuelled public debate. Government and the business community have sought to address these criticisms by improving standards of corporate governance through improved self-regulation. The Cadbury Committee (1992) produced recommendations for a new code of practice to improve accountability and financial control. More recently the Greenbury Committee (1995) produced new standards for overseeing the remuneration of senior executives.

There has also been renewed interest among the public, practitioners and academics in the governance of voluntary and non-profit organisations. In part this interest has been imitative. However, there have also been other important contextual changes which have influenced this new concern with non-profit governance.

Since the early 1980's the size and importance of the voluntary and non-profit sector has increased dramatically. This was partly due to changes in Government policy, particularly the restructuring and contracting out of public services. In many areas Government preferred to use voluntary organisations or private firms to provide services rather than local authorities, for example housing associations were used as the main vehicle to provide social housing and many social services were contracted out to private or non-profit organisations. These increasing demands on the sector and a recognition of its growing importance led to a concern to improve the standards of management and governance. Again this concern was heightened by a few well publicised problems and failures. Interest also arose from another direction. As an increasing number of public bodies were taken out of direct control by government and local authorities, such as Further Education Colleges and Hospital Trusts, there was increased concern about how accountable these new bodies were to the local communities they served, particularly as many had unelected boards (Plummer, 1995; Skelcher and Davis, 1995).

In the voluntary sector, the Government responded to these concerns by introducing the new Charities Act in 1992 and 1993, which tightened the regulatory regime for charities. In addition the Charity Commission, the main body overseeing charities, was revitalised and began to take a more active supervisory role. As part of this work it devoted effort to trying to improve standards of trusteeship by directing greater attention to the role and responsibilities of trustees. In 1991 the Charity Commission and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) established a Working Party on Trustee Training. The aim being to improve the quality of governance among charities and other voluntary organisations. This resulted in the establishment of a Trustees Services Unit at the NCVO in 1993, which among other things produced a comprehensive handbook for trustees (Kirkland, 1994). In addition, both the co-operative movement (Harvey, 1994) and housing associations (NFHA, 1995) conducted their own inquiries into governance and produced new codes of good practice. More recently the Government asked the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life to turn its attention to the conduct of what it called local public spending bodies, covering further and higher education bodies, grant-maintained schools, TECs and LECs and registered housing associations, and it made a variety of recommendations concerning their governance (Nolan, 1996).
Perspectives and Prescriptions

This section critically reviews some of the more recent prescriptive models of governance that have been proposed for both businesses and for non-profit organisations. It leaves aside for the moment any detailed examination of the question of whether such models can be generic by assuming that there are some general features in these models which have relevance across the sectors.

Much of the prescriptive literature tries to delineate the different activities that boards should undertake. Some attempt to do this by outlining different responsibilities, others by defining particular roles and still others by identifying the main functions or tasks. Looking at the literature it is possible to identify four main functions and associated roles for boards. Where authors tend to differ is the emphasis they give to these different functions. These functions are: strategic leadership - setting the overall direction of the organisation and the main policies by which it operates; stewardship - looking after the assets of the organisation, being accountable for them and making sure that management behaves in an appropriate and accountable manner; external relations - mediating the relationship with important external stakeholders; maintenance - organising, running and developing the board itself.

Stewardship

The two governance functions which receive most attention in the prescriptive literature are those of stewardship and leadership.

Given that much of the recent interest in governance was stimulated by high profile company scandals and collapses and a concern over executive pay, it is perhaps not surprising that a good deal of attention has been focused on the stewardship role of boards and the associated questions of monitoring and accountability. Much of the interest surrounding corporate governance in the UK has focused on the Cadbury Committee, which was set up by the Stock Exchange and the accountancy bodies, organisations with regulatory responsibilities, to make recommendations for improving the financial aspects of corporate governance. Cadbury developed a code of best practice which it recommended all the boards of listed companies in the UK should comply with. The code makes recommendations concerning the composition of boards, the separation of duties of the Chair and Chief Executive and the companies reporting and control systems, all designed to strengthen the independence of boards from management and to improve openness and accountability.

This strong emphasis on stewardship, accountability and responsibility is also apparent in much of the recent literature on governance in non-profit organisations. Although the terms of reference of the National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) inquiry into governance were broader than those of the Cadbury Committee about half the final report focuses on issues of accountability, financial control, ethical conduct and probity. The bulk of 'The Good trustees Guide' (Kirkland, 1994) concentrates heavily on how trustees can effectively carry out their legal responsibilities arising from charity, company and employment law. Although trustees responsibilities for policy and strategy are discussed they are devoted relatively little space.

Leadership

In contrast with this emphasis on stewardship and accountability of much British literature, some recent American literature puts much more emphasis on the strategic leadership function (Carver, 1990; Chait,
An important distinction made in this literature is between governance and management. Governance is seen as being concerned with the long term, overall direction of the organisation. It is about the mission or overall goals of the organisation, strategies and policies to guide the organisation and about ensuring that these plans are fulfilled. This contrasts with management which is seen as being concerned with implementation and the more day to day operational aspects of running an organisation.

While there is often some recognition that the boundary between governance and management may be blurred the central message of this literature is that boards should in Chait's (1994) words 'govern more and manage less'. A leading advocate of this approach for non-profit organisations is Richard Carver (1990) who presents what can be called a policy model of governance. Carver's thesis is that boards all too frequently oscillate between interfering in the detailed operations of the organisation, rather than delegating to management, and simply rubber-stamping management decisions. His answer to this trap is for boards to concentrate on setting the overall goals of the organisation and the high level policies that can guide how they are achieved. Within this policy framework management should be left to decide how best goals and policies can be achieved and implemented. Carver's account has a strong flavour of the heroic as board members are urged to: 'lead leaders', 'be obsessed with effects for people', 'don't ponder ends, attack them', 'dare to be bigger than yourself'.

While Carver emphasises the leadership function of non-profit boards more than stewardship and accountability Pound (1995), in his analysis of the state of corporate governance, takes this argument one stage further. Pound distinguishes between two models of corporate governance, what he calls the managed corporation, where governance focuses on accountability and the oversight and monitoring of management and, what he calls the governed corporation, where governance focuses on improving the quality of top level decisions. Pound argues that too much attention in the USA has been given to the first of these models of governance and that the quality of governance will only been improved if the second model is adopted. The two models that Pound identifies correspond quite closely to the two functions of stewardship and strategic leadership as we have identified them. However, Pound's governed corporation model emphasises a partnership between the board and top managers which can improve decision-making. In particular he sees the Board bringing an external perspective and helping to maintain strong links with important shareholders.

An interesting feature of Pound's perspective is that it suggests there may be a tension between the two models, i.e. that there may be a tension between the stewardship and the strategic leadership functions of governance. If board's are primarily concerned with monitoring management then it may be difficult to collaborate actively with management on improving decision-making. This raises interesting questions about the tensions that boards are likely to experience, whether they able to perform both their roles as stewards and leaders well and what might be an appropriate balance between these different functions. Palmer and Harrow (1994) also suggest a similar tension. They propose that board leadership varies on a continuum between what they call 'custodian', guarding the original mission and values of the organisation, and 'entrepreneur' seeking out new opportunities and setting the strategic agenda for the organisation.

External Relations

The external relations functions of boards receives much less attention in the prescriptive literature than stewardship, leadership or maintenance functions. Some of the recent literature on corporate
governance, such as Pound (1995), suggests that boards have an important role maintaining relations with important shareholders, but this contrasts with the dominant model of corporate governance. Similarly the non-profit literature remains relatively silent. Middleton (1987), in a review of the mainly US literature, suggests that the main external function of boards mentioned in what she calls the practitioner (as opposed to academic literature) is fund-raising. Bowen (1994: 24) also suggests that one of the differences of non-profit boards from corporate boards is that many must spend a good deal of time 'mobilising volunteers and raising funds'. In contrast the UK literature says little about the fundraising role of boards and it seems likely that this reflects a cultural difference between the USA and the UK.

**Maintenance**

Boards clearly have some responsibility for maintaining themselves - recruiting members, organising and running their activities and developing their capacity to work effectively (Dulewicz et al, 1995). This maintenance function also receives a good deal of attention in the prescriptive literature. Herman (1989: 194) in his reading of that literature suggests that there is widespread support for activities such as: systematic recruitment processes based on the strengths and weaknesses of the profile of current members and realistic information about the demands of the job; thorough induction and training of new members; processes which encourage participation and team working; the regular assessment of board and board member performance. Again Herman suggests that these prescriptions represent an ideal rather than the reality of most boards.

The literature also offers a good deal of advice about the skills or competencies that board members will need. Kirkland (1994: 14) for example suggests that trustees must have among other things: commitment; integrity; strategic vision; independent judgement; creativity; as well as skills in setting targets, monitoring and evaluation; financial management; legal matters and fund-raising. While recognising that not every trustee will have all these characteristics, and that the main aim is to achieve an overall balance, these prescriptions again have a strong flavour of the heroic about them.

**What Boards Actually Do: the Descriptive Literature**

This section looks at some of the empirical, descriptive literature on boards. The nature of these studies varies quite considerably in both focus and the research methods employed. Middleton (1987), in an earlier review of the academic literature on non-profit boards, suggests that much of this has focused on the relationship between boards and the external environment, unlike the prescriptive literature. In more recent studies the focus is more frequently on the internal workings of boards and the relationship with the organisation. However, detailed empirical studies of the workings of boards are still relatively rare in all sectors (Murray et al, 1992; Peck, 1995; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995 ). Peck also questions the validity of some of findings of existing studies which are based on only one method of observation. For example, he suggests that research based purely on the perceptions of board members may be biased towards reflecting what board members think they should be doing rather than what they actually do.

**External relations**

A good deal of early American research on non-profit boards focused on their external relations. Some of this research came out of the tradition of studies on community power and elites, others on how
organisations managed external dependencies. Middleton (1987) in her review of this literature suggests that boards often play an important role in enabling organisations to manage important dependencies with organisational stakeholders such as funding bodies and may be used to facilitate the organisation's connection to power elites. Empirical studies suggest then that the external relations function of boards is more significant than the prescriptive literature suggests, and that many boards play an important part in facilitating relations with key external groups and organisations, and help to raise funds and support.

**The functions of boards: perceptions and observations**

Empirical studies of boards suggest that the working of boards is more complex, messy and problematic than the prescriptive literature portrays.

There have been a number of studies of the perceptions of board members of their roles and responsibilities. Middleton (1987: 143) summarising the findings of an early study by Fenn (1971), which surveyed 400 businessmen that were on non-profit boards, says:

"They described their five most common functions as fund-raising, establishing operating procedures, enlisting the support of others, budgeting and fiscal control, and balancing the organisation with a different point of view. It is interesting to note that neither supervising management nor broad policy-making is mentioned....'.

A recent survey of trustees in the UK, carried out for the 'On Trust' report (NCVO, 1992) suggested that many trustees were not even fully aware of their legal responsibilities.

Peck's (1995) review of the research on the perceptions of board members serving on corporate and hospital boards reveals contradictory findings with some studies suggesting that boards play an important role in strategy, while others suggest a much more limited involvement. Peck suggests that these differences may reflect the different options offered to respondents by researchers in questionnaires or the desire of directors to portray a positive role for themselves. Pecks' review of a small number of studies based on the direct observation of boards suggests that boards have a limited role in developing strategy and are involved more with approving and legitimating, although he notes again that it is difficult to assess the robustness of these findings. Peck, himself, conducted research on the workings of the board of a hospital trust using questionnaires, the analysis of minutes and the observation of meetings. The minutes and observations showed that the majority of the board's time was spent receiving and approving proposals. In this case he concludes that the board did not set strategy but was involved in approving it and had an important role in facilitating external relations.

**Different types of boards**

As was suggested above the empirical literature indicates a good deal of variety in board behaviour. A number of authors have tried to capture and describe this variety by developing typologies of boards.

Pfeffer (1973) differentiated between hospital boards in terms of functions that had priority on the board's agenda. He identifies four main functions: fund-raising; administration or management; representation of sub-group interests; and influence in the community. It is interesting that three of these functions are concerned with external relations, which, as we have noted, usually receives much less attention in the prescriptive literature.
A number of typologies also cast doubt on the common prescription that boards should focus exclusively on policy. Stone (1989) distinguishes between 'administrative' boards and 'policy making' boards. Administrative boards are concerned more with the operational detail of programmes and are more common in smaller organisations. Policy-making boards are more concerned with policy decisions and are more common in larger organisations.

A criticism of most typologies is that they present a static picture of board behaviour. In contrast Wood (1992), in one of the most interesting typologies, develops a cyclical model of how boards change. She suggests that after a non-recurring founding phase boards progress through three distinct phases - a supermanaging phase, a corporate phase and a ratifying phase. The board then experiences a crisis which precipitates the cycle of three phases again. The founding phase is divided into two periods. A collective phase when the board is very actively involved in running the agency. This is followed by supportive phase when the running of the agency is transferred to an executive and the board becomes less active seeing its role as supporting the executive. The supermanaging phase is precipitated by a crisis when the board has to act to put the organisation's house in order. The board is involved in both policy-making and management and may be accused of meddling in management issues. When the crisis recedes members begin to feel over committed and the board focuses more on policy, leaving management issues to the executive. This is the corporate phase. Over time the independence displayed by the corporate-style board reduces as it becomes more dependent on management. This leads to the ratifying phase: management prepares recommendations for the board which are usually ratified with little questioning. Eventually this leads to a crisis with the cycle repeating itself.

As with all life-cycle models, Wood's model can be criticised for being overly deterministic. However it is important in pointing to the importance of change and the influence of circumstances on the role of boards and their relationship with management. In particular it suggests that crises are important in stimulating changes in board behaviour and that boards may oscillate between taking an active role and a more passive, ratifying role, and between an active involvement with management and a focus on policy.

Murray et al (1992) present a typology based on the distribution of power in and around boards. They identify five types of boards based on their research: CEO dominated, Chair-dominated, fragmented power, power sharing, and powerless boards. The CEO dominated board has more of a figurehead role and is not a major influence on the organisation. It resembles what Wood calls the ratifying board. The chair-dominated board is similar except that this time it is the chair who is the major influence. The fragmented power board consists of a number of different individuals and groups representing different external interest groups, who have different beliefs and ideologies about what the organisation should be doing. As a result the board is characterised by conflict. Members of the power-sharing board share a strong commitment to the values of democracy and equality. The board rejects any dominant leadership by one person or group and insists on participation and consultation. The norm is for consensus decision-making. There is some resemblance between this type of board and Wood's collective or super-managing phases of board development. The powerless board is characterised by lack of clarity over the role and responsibilities of board members and a degree of apathy. Harris (1991) describes how through a cycle of self-reinforcing expectations between board members and managers, boards can get locked into a fairly powerless and minimal role.

The work on typologies of boards suggests that there is a good deal of variety among boards. There is some support for Peck's view that many boards, at least at some stages in their development, are more
involved with ratifying management proposals than actively developing policy. However, the typologies suggest that this is not universal, nor may it be a permanent state of affairs. Equally, the prescription that boards should focus on policy and leave management to managers is not always followed by many boards. Wood suggests that both in the founding stage when the organisation is small, or in response to crises, boards may become actively involved in management. Murray et al's typology also suggests that some types of boards may find it difficult exercising their stewardship role, for instance boards dominated by their CEO, or powerless boards, are likely to have difficulty holding management accountable.

**Board-management relations**

The legal position of boards is that they are the ultimate authority within non-profit organisations, responsible for appointing and supervising management and deciding the policy of the organisation. Much of the prescriptive literature stresses the superior-subordinate relationship that exists between boards and senior management. However, executives have considerable sources of power. They are likely to have access to more information about the organisation and its work, be in the best position to formulate policy and strategy and influence how decisions are implemented. Where the considerable power of executives is recognised in the prescriptive literature there is usually a call for partnership between boards and senior management.

Middleton (1987:149), based on her review of the limited empirical literature, suggests again that this is too simple a picture and that the relationship between boards and their executives is better described as one of 'complex loops and tangled hierarchies'. She suggests that the relationship might be affected by a range of factors including the composition of the board, the size and complexity of the organisation and the situation the organisation is facing, such a particular crisis. The five different patterns of power relations concerning boards and senior management identified by Murray et al (1992) and Wood's (1992) proposal that the relationship between boards and management are likely to change over time in response to crises lend support to Middleton's position. Harris (1993: 271) suggests that power relations tend to be 'unstable and unequal'.

A number of studies suggest that the most common outcome is for management to be the dominant 'partner'. Harris (1993: 271) notes a common pattern in her study of local boards of a national welfare advice agency where 'staff withhold information from board, and boards were unable to participate fully in decisions or exercise control over staff.' Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) in their study of members of large corporate boards found that the influence of non-executive board members tended to peak in times of transition and crisis. This again lends some support to Wood's life cycle model that it is in times of crisis that board tend to intervene and assert their power over management. Murray et al (1992) found that CEO dominated board was the most commonly perceived governance pattern by senior executives of non-profit organisations. However, this was followed quite close second by the power sharing board. Since Berle and Means (1932) there is a tradition of management theorising that suggests a managerial hegemony over organisational control. While lending some support to this thesis the limited empirical evidence also suggests that this domination is not universal or inevitable.

Herman and Heimovics (1990), in a study of leadership in non-profit organisations, surveyed presidents (chairs) and CEOs to see what they attributed various organisational successes to. They summarised their results as follows:
'In short, chief executives are assigned and accept responsibility for both successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Board presidents see themselves as affecting outcomes very little.' (p.171).

Given the centrality of the chief executives role, they carried out research to try to distinguish the skills that differentiate effective chief executives. A group of executives who were reputed by outside 'experts' to be effective were compared with a control group. The results suggested that effective executives provided significantly more leadership for their boards than the others.

These results need to be treated with some caution given the small sample size and its limitation to a specific geographical location. In addition it may be that board leadership activity is more likely to be visible to outsiders, and lead to executives being perceived as effective, irrespective of how effective they actually are. Nevertheless the study is interesting in pointing to the important role that some executives play in developing the boards of their organisation. Drucker (1990: 13) reinforces this view. He states that while it would be preferable if this developmental role were taken on by the board chair, in practice this does not work as they are usually too busy. As a result it is better to assign this responsibility to executives even though there may be a danger of the board becoming a creature of the executive. Again this view differs from much of the prescriptive literature which emphasises the chair's role in maintaining and developing the board.

Towards a research agenda

This review of the literature on organisational governance leads to two main conclusions. First, as both Middleton (1987) and Herman (1989) observed, there is still a wide gap between many prescriptive and descriptive accounts of what boards do. The empirical studies of board suggest that the prescriptive literature presents an unrealistic and idealistic account of what boards are capable of, underestimating the constraints that limited time and expertise place on board members and their dependence on management. Of course there will always be a gap between prescription and practice but if this becomes too wide there is a danger that these prescriptions will be seen as unattainable and they will loose their power to motivate and guide action. How might this gap be narrowed?

One approach would be for those who advocate prescriptive models to take greater account of the empirical literature, which shows some of the difficulties and constraints board members operate under. For example the idea that board members should formulate and decide policy seems unrealistic except perhaps in the smallest of organisations or for short periods. An alternative formulation might be to see policy and strategy as a joint responsibility of senior management and the board, even if final approval rests with the board. In this model strategy is 'co-produced' by the board and the executive. This is similar to the model proposed by Pound (1995) where the role of the board is to 'add value' to decisions, by scrutinising them and representing the interests of important stakeholders and to Herman's (1989: 198) proposal for joint decision -making. Such a model will require a change in the role of the executive. As Herman and Heimovics (1990) suggest this is likely to require executives to play an important role in facilitating and developing the work of their board. If they are to avoid the board becoming a rubber stamp then part of their job will be to involve the board in the process of policy and strategy development and to present boards with options rather than final 'solutions'. Even this model is likely to be difficult to achieve and there is still a good deal of scope for more empirical research which focuses on the working of boards and processes of board development.
Another promising approach is suggested by the work of Harris (1993). Instead of trying to prescribe the responsibilities and roles of board members and senior staff she advocates a procedure which can help both sides clarify how they see each other’s responsibilities.

Although existing empirical research has helped to challenge many common assumptions and prescriptions about the workings of boards, a second conclusion is that this area of research is still relatively neglected. As a number of commentators have pointed out there is a shortage of good reliable empirical studies on the workings of boards (e.g. Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Peck, 1995). Many of the studies that have been carried out rely on the perceptions of board members or managers. As Peck (1995) has suggested studies which rely on a single method of observation are likely to give an unreliable view of what actually happens. Ideally, what is needed are studies of boards that combine different observational methods, in particular the direct observation of board meetings and interactions between board members and management. In addition, given that the performance of boards is likely to change over time, more longitudinal studies are needed, or alternatively, studies of organisations at different stages of development, in order to examine possible life-cycle effects. There are many possible focuses for this research, but I would suggest two priorities.

One priority is the *relationship between senior managers and boards*. As the review of existing research suggests it is difficult in practice to neatly separate out the roles and responsibilities of boards and managers. It would be useful to have research that focused on how the relationships between board members, board officers and senior managers develop and change over time. This needs to take account of how each perceives their respective roles, the way they negotiate their relationships, and the pressures, constraints and tensions they face in carrying them out. Important constraints that board members are likely to face are limited time, dependence on management for information and possibly limited competence. In particular it would be useful to identify and examine what ‘coping strategies’ board members use to deal with the difficulties they face and how effective they are.

A second priority is more research which focuses on the *change and development of boards*. Wood’s (1992) life cycle model provides a useful starting point and it would be interesting to see if her findings can be replicated in other settings. One attempt to test the model (Dart et al, 1996) throws doubt on the more behavioural aspects of the model and suggests more in-depth studies are required to test its validity. Another approach would be to conduct action research or evaluation research on various types of intervention to improve board effectiveness. For example, Carver’s model of governance has received a good deal of attention in the UK and the USA and it would be interesting to study organisations that have tried to implement this model and see how it has affected their performance. Perhaps this last line of research, which attempts to evaluate different models of good practice and their effects, is most likely to help close the gap between the prescriptive and descriptive accounts of what boards do.
References


